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In Gaussian quantum key distribution eavesdropping attacks are conventionally modeled through the universal
entangling cloner scheme, which is based on the premise that the whole environment is under control of the
adversary, i.e., the eavesdropper purifies the system. This assumption implies that the eavesdropper has either
access to an identity (noiseless) channel or an infinite amount of entanglement in order to simulate such an
identity channel. In this work we challenge the necessity of this assumption and we propose a teleportation-based
eavesdropping attack, where the eavesdropper is not assumed to have access to the shared channel, that represents
the unavoidable noise due to the environment. Under collective measurements, this attack reaches optimality
in the limit of an infinite amount of entanglement, while for finite entanglement resources it outperforms the
corresponding optimal individual attack. We also calculate the minimum amount of distributed entanglement that
is necessary for this eavesdropping scheme, since we consider it as the operationally critical quantity capturing
the limitations of a realistic attack. We conclude that the fact that an infinite amount of entanglement is required
for an optimal collective eavesdropping attack signifies the robustness of Gaussian quantum key distribution.
DOI: 10.1103/PhysRevResearch.2.013208
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum key distribution (QKD) [1–3] is one of the most
prominent quantum communication protocols, enabling two
parties (Alice and Bob) to establish a shared (random) secret
key for cryptographic purposes. It was originally developed
for discrete-variable (DV) quantum systems [4,5] but has also
been extended to the continuous-variable (CV) regime [6–8].
A clear advantage of the CV-QKD schemes (see Refs. [9–13]
for recent advances) over their DV counterparts is the low-
cost telecom optical components needed, which are already
available for classical communication.
We generally consider the following assumptions for an
eavesdropper (Eve) in a QKD scheme [1–3]: (i) Eve has
full access to the quantum channel between Alice and Bob,
(ii) Eve has unlimited computational power, (iii) Eve can
monitor the public classical channel but she cannot modify the
messages (authenticated channel), and (iv) Eve has no access
to Alice’s and Bob’s laboratories.
The most powerful attack Eve can asymptotically perform
is the so-called collective attack [14], where she prepares and
interacts a set of individual and identical quantum systems
with the quantum signals sent from Alice to Bob. She then
stores the output ensemble into her quantum memory for a
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future collective measurement (an individual attack would
rely on individual measurements respectively). The uncondi-
tional security of a QKD protocol can be achieved by upper
bounding the information Eve can extract, also known as the
Holevo bound [15].
The question we answer in the context of Gaussian QKD
in this paper is the following: Can Eve optimally attack the
system under collective measurements without having access
to the quantum channel between Alice and Bob? In other
words, we investigate the necessity of the first assumption
(discussed before) regarding Eve’s capabilities. We conclude
that it is indeed not necessary for Eve to have access to
the channel in order to collectively attack a system as long
as she can perform an all-optical teleportation [16] over it.
In particular, we propose a teleportation-based eavesdropping
scheme that serves as an alternative type of attack to the well-
known entangling cloner [17–19] that assumes Eve’s access
to the shared quantum channel.
We further discuss how, under this scheme, Eve’s informa-
tion depends on the amount of entanglement she can prepare,
distribute, and distill in order to successfully perform the
all-optical teleportation protocol [16] (see Refs. [20–27]).
Employing collective measurements and using a resource
state with the least required amount of entanglement, Eve’s
information reaches the bound for optimal individual at-
tacks [28,29]. Using the same setup and taking the limit to
infinite entanglement for the resource state, Eve’s information
approaches the ultimate bound for an eavesdropping attack,
also known as the Holevo bound [15].
We identify the distributed entanglement used as a re-
source for teleportation as the operationally critical quantity
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capturing the limitations of a realistic Eve. Under this limita-
tion we evaluate the secret key rate that Alice and Bob achieve
conditioned on their belief on how powerful (in entanglement
resources) Eve is. Note that other types of physical limitations
on Eve’s capabilities for CV-QKD systems have also been
studied in Refs. [30,31].
In Sec. II we briefly introduce how CV-QKD works in the
Gaussian regime, and in Sec. III we present the conventional
way an eavesdropping attack is modeled through the univer-
sal entangling cloner scheme. The alternative eavesdropping
attack based on the all-optical teleportation is proposed in
Sec. IV, and in Sec. V we discuss the results of a specific
example. Finally, we conclude this work with Sec. VI. The
protocols of both the standard CV teleportation and the all-
optical teleportation are discussed in Appendix.
II. GAUSSIAN CV-QKD
A generic QKD protocol in a prepare-and-measure (PM)
scheme consists of (i) quantum communication, where Alice
encodes classical information into conjugate quantum basis
states, which are sent through an insecure quantum channel to
Bob, who measures the received quantum states in a randomly
chosen basis, resulting in two sets of correlated data, and
(ii) classical communication (classical postprocessing) over
a public but authenticated classical channel, where Alice
and Bob extract a secret key from the correlated data they
collected during the previous step.
In a fully Gaussian CV-QKD protocol [32,33] (in the PM
scheme) Alice encodes a classical random variable “a” (drawn
from a Gaussian distribution) onto Gaussian quantum states,
squeezed states [34], or coherent states [35] and sends them
through an insecure quantum channel to Bob, who measures
the received quantum states using homodyne or heterodyne
detection to obtain a classical random variable “b.”
Gaussian (collective or individual) attacks are asymptot-
ically optimal [36–39], and the asymptotic secret key rate
against optimal collective attacks is given by [40,41]
K := βI (a:b) − S (x:E ) , (1)
where I (a:b) is the classical mutual information between Al-
ice and Bob, and S (x:E ) is the maximum mutual information
between Alice (x≡a) and Eve (in the direct reconciliation
where Alice is the reference of the reconciliation in the
classical postprocessing), or between Bob (x≡b) and Eve
(in the reverse reconciliation where Bob is the reference of
the reconciliation). The coefficient 0  β  1 is the recon-
ciliation efficiency [9–13]. Note that the maximum amount
of information Eve can possibly extract from the collective
attack is upper bounded by the Holevo bound χ (x:E ) [15],
i.e.,
S (x:E )  χ (x:E ) . (2)
Gaussian states [33,42–44] σ̂ are the ones that can be
fully characterized by the mean value and the variance of
the quadrature field operators q̂ := (x̂1, p̂1, . . . , x̂n, p̂n)T , with
x̂ j := â j + â†j and p̂ j := i(â†j − â j ), where â j and â†j are the
annihilation and creation operators, respectively. Without los-
ing generality we assume a zero mean-valued state that can
be fully described by its covariance matrix, whose arbitrary
element is given by σi j := 12 〈{q̂i, q̂ j}〉. The covariance matrix







with A = diag(a, a), B = diag(b, b), and C = diag(c+, c−),
where a  b and c+  |c−|  0. A two-mode squeezed vac-
uum has a = b = 1+ζ 21−ζ 2 and c+ = −c− = 2ζ1−ζ 2 , where 0 
ζ < 1 is the squeezing parameter. The covariance matrix
transformation when a phase-insensitive single-mode Gaus-
sian channel G acts on one arm of a two-mode Gaussian state
σ in is given by [47]
σout = G(σ in ) = (1 ⊕ U )σ in(1 ⊕ U )T + (0 ⊕ V ) , (4)
where U = √τ1 and V = v1. Significant phase-insensitive
Gaussian channels are the following: (i) the lossy channel
L with transmissivity 0 < τ < 1 and noise v = (1 − τ )ε
(pure loss Lp for ε = 1, thermal loss for ε > 1), (ii) the
amplifier channel A with gain τ > 1 and noise v = (τ − 1)ε
(pure amplifier Ap for ε = 1, thermal amplifier for ε > 1),
(iii) the classical additive noise channel N with τ = 1 and
noise v > 0, and (iv) the identity channel I with τ = 1 and
v = 0, representing the ideal nondecohering channel.
Let us assume that Alice and Bob identify in their in-
between interaction a phase-insensitive channel G, that we
assume to be a thermal lossy channel with transmissivity
0 < τ < 1 and noise v = (1 − τ )ε, but the result can be
trivially extended to any non-entanglement-breaking [48],
phase-insensitive channel.
Each Gaussian PM scheme can be represented using an
equivalent entanglement-based scheme [32], where Alice
prepares a pure Gaussian entangled state, i.e., a two-mode
squeezed vacuum state σ in, keeping one mode while sending
the second mode through the quantum channel. If Alice
applies a homodyne (heterodyne) detection, the second mode
of the entangled states is projected onto a squeezed (coherent)
state. While the PM scheme is preferred in the experimental
demonstration of CV-QKD, the entanglement-based scheme
is favored for the security analysis.
III. UNIVERSAL ENTANGLING CLONER ATTACK
In the entangling cloner setup [17–19], the whole channel
G is associated with a potential eavesdropper that has full
control of the environment. Eve uses a two-mode squeezed
vacuum state and mixes one arm of it with Alice’s signal in
a beam splitter with transmissivity equal to the transmissivity
of the quantum channel. For the collective attack, one of the
outputs is sent directly to Bob while the rest are stored in
her quantum memory. Finally, she collectively measures the
stored ensemble to gain the maximum information about the
distributed key. This scheme is schematically represented in
Fig. 1.
An assumption that has been taken in this setup is that Eve
is able to noiselessly transmit the output signal of the beam
splitter to Bob. Obviously, this is a really strong assumption,
since Eve has to deal with some unavoidable decoherence due
to environmental reasons that go beyond her control, but even
theoretically that is impossible because simulating identity
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FIG. 1. Eavesdropping attack. On the top panel we present the
entangling cloner attack, where Eve simulates the channel G through
a beam splitter Bτ (with the same transmissivity as channel G). One
input of the beam splitter is Alice’s signal and the other is one arm
of Eve’s state ϕ′. With M1−2 we represent the measurements that
Eve perform later on her quantum memory on her state μ′, and 1
the identity channel. On the bottom panel we present the all-optical
teleportation attack, where Eve performs an all-optical teleportation
over the signal sent from Alice. With ρ we denote Eve’s distilled
resource state. The all-optical teleportation consists of a two-mode
squeezer Sg with gain g, which is in Eve’s first station close to Alice,
and a beam splitter Bt with transmissivity t = 1/g, which is in Eve’s
second station close to Bob. One mode of Eve’s resource state ρ is
sent to the first station as an input of Sg. The other mode of ρ is sent
to the second station and is mixed on a beam splitter Bη with another
state ϕ, before it becomes an input to Bt . Finally, Eve performs the
measurements M1−3 on her state μ that was stored in the quantum
memory.
channels through teleportation in CV systems requires an
infinite amount of entanglement.
For the case of optimal individual attacks it has already
been shown [28,29] that they can be realistically modeled
through the standard CV-teleportation protocol [23]; however,
this protocol is dependent on individual Bell-type measure-
ments and thus it cannot be directly used for collective attacks.
In order to realistically model an optimal collective attack, we
propose below an eavesdropping scheme, based on the all-
optical teleportation protocol [16] that is measurement-free.
IV. ALL-OPTICAL TELEPORTATION ATTACK
In this type of attack, represented in Fig. 1, we start by
assuming that there exists a physical quantum channel G
between Alice and Bob through which all the participants
(including Eve) must send their signals. Given this limitation,
Eve (who is allowed to establish stations arbitrarily close
to Alice’s and Bob’s laboratories) performs an all-optical
teleportation protocol [16] (details can be found in Appendix)
over this channel G. In general, any Gaussian channel can
be simulated via a quantum teleportation protocol using an
appropriate resource state [49–51]. Given a Gaussian phase-
insensitive channel G, the set of all resource states that can
simulate it have been derived in Ref. [52] (see also Ref. [53]).
For our purposes, we assume that Eve can prepare, dis-
tribute, and distill a pure two-mode squeezed vacuum state
ρ with squeezing parameter 0  γ < 1. One arm of it is used
for the initial amplification (performed on Eve’s station close
to Alice’s side) through the two-mode squeezer Sg with gain
g > 1 [54]. Employing a beam splitter Bη with transmissivity
0  η  1, we mix the second arm of ρ with one arm of
another two-mode squeezed vacuum state ϕ with a squeezing
parameter 0  κ < 1, which is prepared and used on Eve’s
station close to Bob’s side. (Note that for a pure loss channel G
the two-mode squeezed vacuum states ϕ and ϕ′ are reduced to
single-mode vacuum states |0〉 for both the entangling cloner
and the all-optical teleportation attack.) One output of Bη is
headed to another beam splitter Bt with transmissivity t = 1/g
for the final attenuation of the signal before it is forwarded to
Bob.
The final step for Eve is to perform a collective measure-
ment on the modes that she has stored in her quantum mem-
ory, denoted as a quantum state μ. The maximum information
that she can extract from those measurements is given by [32]
S (x:E ) = S (μ) − S (μ|x) , (5)
where S (·) denotes the von Neumann entropy, which can be
















and S (μ|x) is the von Neumann entropy for Eve’s quantum
system conditioned on Alice or Bob’s measurement.
The challenging part for Eve is to prepare, distribute, and
distill pure entangled states ρ over the corresponding distance
between Alice and Bob. Thus, we assess her performance
through the amount of entanglement of her state ρ. The least
amount of entanglement needed for the simulation of the
channel G [52], and consecutively, for any teleportation-based
attack, is given by




τ − √(v + 1 − τ )(v − 1 + τ )
τ + v + 1 , (8)
with E being the entropy of entanglement [56], given by
E (γ ) := 2γ
2 log2 γ + (1 − γ 2) log2(1 − γ 2)
(γ 2 − 1) ln 2 . (9)
V. DISCUSSION
For our numerical calculations we assume that the quantum
channel that Alice and Bob initially share is a thermal loss
channel G with τ = 0.25, corresponding to approximately
30 km of optical fiber, and ε = 1.01. Alice’s state is a two-
mode squeezed vacuum with squeezing parameter ζ = 0.7,
and the reconciliation efficiency is set equal to β = 0.95. Al-
ice and Bob measure their modes with heterodyne detection,
and Eve performs an all-optical teleportation attack in the
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FIG. 2. Eve’s information and key rate. In figure (a) with the solid blue line we plot the amount of information S (b:E ) Eve can extract in
the reverse reconciliation scenario against the entanglement of her pure resource state E (ρ), parametrized over the squeezing parameter γ . The
horizontal red dashed line represents the Holevo bound χ (b:E ), and in the limit of infinite entanglement, i.e., E (γ → 1) → ∞, we see that
this bound is reached. With the green dot-dashed line we indicate the maximum amount of information Eve can extract through an optimal
individual attack [28,29]. In figure (b) we have the corresponding key rate that Alice and Bob measure given Eve’s collective attack. Again,
the red dashed line is the minimum possible key rate that they can extract, and the green dot-dash represents the key rate based on the optimal
individual attack. In both plots the gray color indicates nonphysical areas.
limit of g → ∞ (the protocol works for a finite amount of
gain g as well but with less success for Eve).
The plot in Fig. 2(a) shows Eve’s information for this
protocol in the reverse reconciliation scenario, maximized
over the parameters {η, κ} that can simulate the channel G,
as a function of the entanglement of state ρ. Note that for a
pure loss channel there is no need for an optimization, since
the transmissivity can just be set equal to η = τ/γ 2. The value
for the Holevo bound that Eve has to reach is given by [32]
χ = S (σout) − S (σout|b) , (10)
where S (σout|b) is the von Neumann entropy of the entangled
state shared between Alice and Bob conditioned on Bob’s
measurement. The plot in Fig. 2(b) shows the achievable
secret key rate calculated by Alice and Bob, based on Eq. (1)
and the mutual information, which for this protocol is given by
I (a:b) = log2
aτ + v + 1
τ + v + 1 . (11)
The key rate calculated in Fig. 2 is for the asymptotic
regime. However, if we include the finite-size effects [57,58],
there would be some circumstances that while positive finite
key rates cannot be generated from optimal collective attacks
[under the unrealistic assumption of infinite entanglement
with E (γ→1)], by considering optimal individual attacks
[under the assumption that Eve can distill a pure entangled
state with E (γmin)] we are able to move from an insecure
regime to a secure regime and generate nontrivial positive
finite key rates.
We also plot the corresponding values for Eve’s infor-
mation and secret key rate under an optimal individual at-
tack [28,29]. We observe that when Eve uses the minimum
required amount of entanglement resources, i.e., E (γmin), the
attack reduces to the optimal individual attack. At this point,
the beam splitter Bη is not interacting with the signal, i.e.,
η = 1, and the parameter κ becomes irrelevant.
Eve’s information monotonically increases with the
amount of entanglement, and it approaches the Holevo bound
in the limit of infinite entanglement, i.e., E (γ→1) → ∞. In
this extreme point, the beam splitter Bη has transmissivity
equal to the channel’s transitivity, i.e., η = τ , and the state ϕ
has a squeezing parameter κ = √(ε − 1)/(ε + 1). It is worth
noting that the teleportation part of the protocol at this stage is
operating under the Choi state [59] (maximally entangled state
sent through the channel). So, having access to a maximally
entangled state is the tradeoff in order to reach optimality in
the teleportation-based attack without purifying the system.
The notion of optimality in the extreme case of infinite
entanglement is justified by the fact that a physical bound is
reached, i.e., the Holevo bound, that we cannot surpass. A
meaningful question to ask at this point may be the follow-
ing: For a given finite amount of entanglement, what is the
optimal collective attack? To this day, a physical limit that
upper bounds the amount of classical information that can
be extracted from a quantum channel under the use of finite
entanglement has not been established. Thus, even though
numerical searches indicate the scheme proposed in this work
seems to operate optimally for any value of entanglement, we
will forgo making such a strong claim.
Finally, the fact that Eve needs an extremely large amount
of entanglement in order to approach the optimal collective
attack showcases the robustness of CV-QKD protocols. In-
terestingly, even the minimum amount of entanglement given
in Eq. (7) is arguably beyond current technological capabili-
ties [60]. In DV protocols there is no need for a similar anal-
ysis, since Bell states are not unphysical, and the entangling
cloner can operate without any unrealistic assumptions.
Another possibility for Eve that is worth investigating
would be to use the hybrid type of teleportation introduced in
Ref. [25]. In this scheme a continuous-variable state splits up
to N qubits, which probabilistically can be teleported through
DV teleportation [21]. In this scenario the need for infinite
amount of entanglement of a single state is compensated with
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the need of infinite copies of Bell states. With any finite
amount of splitting, though, this protocol simulates a non-
Gaussian channel due to the inevitable truncation of the initial
state.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this work, we showed that optimal collective attacks in
CV-QKD are always based on an extremely strong assumption
that takes different forms depending on the way we model
the eavesdropper, i.e., full-system purification, simulation of
an identity channel, access to a resource state with infinite
amount of entanglement, access to infinite copies of Bell
states. However, the requirement of having access to a re-
source state with an infinite amount of entanglement can be
“tamed,” and a teleportation-based scheme can be modeled
that operates in the regime between the optimal individual and
optimal collective attacks, depending on the available entan-
glement resources. Thus, the all-optical teleportation attack
we introduced in this paper can be thought of as a universal
eavesdropping scheme for Gaussian QKD that can be reduced
to either an optimal individual or optimal collective attack,
depending on the available entanglement resources, without
assuming Eve has access to the entire environment.
An interesting extension of this work would be the analysis
of the all-optical teleportation attack in other CV-QKD pro-
tocols such as two-way [61] or discretely modulated [48,62]
CV-QKD. The main technical hurdle in analyzing the latter
case is that although optimal strategies have been found for
distinguishing discrete sets of CV states in the purely individ-
ual attack regime [63], finding the optimal collective attack
for such non-Gaussian protocols is much more challenging
although recently progress has been made in this area [64–67].
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APPENDIX: QUANTUM TELEPORTATION
Quantum teleportation is one of the key tools in quan-
tum information theory, initially introduced for discrete vari-
ables [20,21] and then extended to CV systems [16,22,23].
(See also [24] for a universal approach on teleportation and
Ref. [27] for recent advances.) There are also protocols for
hybrid situations [25,26].
Let us assume that we want to teleport a (null mean-valued)
single-mode Gaussian state (in the main text this mode cor-
responds to the one that Alice sends to Bob) with covariance
matrix σ in from one place (laboratory 1) to another (laboratory
2). In Gaussian systems, a necessary quantum resource in
order to achieve that is a two-mode entangled state ρ, shared





a · c ·
· a · −c
c · b ·
· −c · b
⎤
⎥⎦ . (A1)
The quality of the teleportation protocol is limited by
the amount of entanglement that is preshared between the
two parties, and perfect teleportation is achieved only in
the limit of maximum amount of entanglement resources. In
CV systems, though, maximum entanglement is unphysical,
since that would require infinite energy. Thus, realistically,
instead of achieving a perfect state teleportation, we always
end up with a slightly noisy copy of the target state. This
process can be modeled as the decoherence that a quantum
channel (completely positive trace-preserving map) induces
to a transmitted state [68,69].
In general, any Gaussian channel can be simulated via a
quantum teleportation protocol using an appropriate resource
state [49–51]. Given a Gaussian phase-insensitive channel
G, the set of resource states that can simulate it have been
calculated in Ref. [52], generalizing previous results [53].
1. Standard CV teleportation protocol
The most well-known CV teleportation protocol was pro-
posed by Braunstein and Kimble [23]. In this protocol one arm
of the resource state is mixed with the input state through a
balanced beam splitter in laboratory 1, followed by a Bell-type
measurement, i.e., dual homodyne detection (measuring the x̂
quadrature on one arm and the p̂ on the other), HD, and the
results are sent to laboratory 2 through a classical channel, CC.
Finally, in laboratory 2 a displacement operation proportional
to the results of these measurements, D, is applied to the other
arm of the resource state in order to reconstruct the input
state, i.e., teleport it. Graphically this protocol is depicted
in Fig. 3(a). With a Gaussian resource state of the form of
Eq. (A1), this teleportation protocol corresponds to a Gaussian
phase-insensitive channel with transmissivity τtel and noise
vtel given by
τtel = λ , (A2a)
vtel = aλ − 2c
√
λ + b , (A2b)
where λ  0 is the experimentally accessible gain. Note that
we assumed an infinite energy limit in the Bell-type measure-
ment detection.
2. All-optical teleportation protocol
An alternative all-optical teleportation protocol was pro-
posed by Ralph [16], and it is graphically presented in
Fig. 3(b). In this protocol one arm of the resource state is
fed into a parametric amplifier along with the input state in
laboratory 1. The output amplified signal is directly sent to
laboratory 2, which means that it has to go through some
decoherence that can be modeled as a quantum channel G,
that is initially shared between the two laboratories. Finally,
013208-5
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FIG. 3. Quantum teleportation protocols. In figure (a) we present
the standard CV teleportation protocol via its basic components:
(i) the dual homodyne detection, HD, between the resource state
ρ and the initial state σin; (ii) the classical channel, CC; (iii) the
displacement, D; and (iv) the output state σout. In figure (b) the all-
optical teleportation protocol is presented. In this protocol, the basic
components are (i) a two-mode squeezer Sg, (ii) a beam splitter Bt ,
and (iii) the decoherence that the signal has to go through modeled
with a quantum channel G.
in laboratory 2 we mix the signal with the second arm of
the resource state on a beam splitter, where the induced
transmissivity is inversely proportional to the amplification
applied in laboratory 1.
Let us assume that we want to teleport the same state
σ in as in the standard CV teleportation protocol. In order
to do so, we use a two-mode Gaussian resource state with
a covariance matrix ρ of the form of Eq. (A1). The initial
state can be represented by a combined three-mode covariance
matrix σ in ⊕ ρ. The amplification is achieved by a two-mode
squeezer [54], where the two inputs are the initial state and
one arm of the resource entangled state. The corresponding






g · √g−1 ·
· √g · −√g−1√
g−1 · √g ·
· −√g−1 · √g
·




where g = cosh2 r  1, with r ∈ R being the two-mode
squeezing parameter. Note that the symplectic transformation
Sg is applied to the initial three-mode state σ in ⊕ ρ, where the
identity submatrix of Sg indicates that the second arm of the
resource state remains unaffected at this stage.
Applying enough amplification to surpass the quantum
limit, we end up with a signal that can directly be sent to
the other laboratory, but it still needs to go through some
decoherence due to the environment. Let us assume that this
decoherence is a thermal channel G, with transmissivity/gain
τ and noise v.
The subsequent attenuation can be modeled with a beam
splitter, where in one port we feed in the previously amplified
state (that is decohered through the environment) and in the
other the second arm of the resource entangled state. The



















with a transmission ratio equal to t = λ/(gτ ). Applying on
the initial state σ in ⊕ ρ the two-mode squeezer Sg we get the
amplified state Sg(σ in ⊕ ρ)STg . This amplified state transforms
according to Eq. (4) due to the decoherence into G[Sg(σ in ⊕
ρ)STg ]. Finally, this decohered state goes through the final
beam splitter Bt and evolves into Bt {G[Sg(σ in ⊕ ρ)STg ]}BTt .
Tracing out mode 2 (the second output of the amplifica-
tion) and mode 3 (the second output of the attenuation)
from this state (see Fig. 3) we get the output state σout =
tr23Bt {G[Sg(σ in ⊕ ρ)STg ]}BTt .
This teleportation protocol corresponds to a Gaussian
phase-insensitive channel with transmissivity τtel and noise
vtel given by
τtel = λ , (A5a)
vtel = aλ − 2c
√
λ(g − 1)(gτ − λ)
τg2




In the limit of infinite amplification, i.e., g → ∞,
Eq. (A5b) reduces to Eq. (A2b), and the output signal of
the all-optical teleportation protocol becomes equivalent to
that of the standard CV teleportation protocol. For finite
amplification and the same amount of entanglement resources,
the all-optical teleportation protocol will always correspond to
an equally or a slightly more noisy effective channel than the
standard CV teleportation protocol, but its big advantage is
that there is no need for individual Bell-type measurements
during the teleportation process. The significance of this ad-
vantage is crucial for the results of the main text.
It is worth noting that in the main text we use the all-optical
protocol to simulate the exact same channel as the one that
represents the environment, G. Thus, we set λ = τ , which
implies that t = 1/g.
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